

Fadi Sabaya express gratitude and appreciation to the Iraqi President and his great people. Jenin - relatives of the Shahids express their utmost gratitude and congratulations to the Mujahed, warrior leader, the President of Iraq Saddam Hussein, may God keep him safe. (Al Quds, January 2001)



Much gratitude and appreciation to the honorable President Saddam Hussein and members of Arab Liberation Front.

The father of the Shahid, his brothers and sisters, the Abu Farhah family and his relatives and uncles on the mother and father side, grandfather and mother on behalf of the entire Palestinian people express their deep gratitude to the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, may God keep him safe, the symbol of nationalism, patriotism and Arab determination, for the honest condolences he offered to our Shahid Palestine Muhammad Raab Qassem Abu Talab and the families of all Shahids, as well as his great help in Palestine. Gratitude to our Iraqi brothers, who give blood and money for the victory of the Palestinian people, the freedom and independence and liberation of Palestine. We also express to our friends in the Arab Liberation Front, Jenin Area much gratitude for their participation and national determination, the condolences they offered, material and moral support. *Together, until the liberation of the holy Jerusalem with the help of Allah.*



The Ties with Saudi Arabia

26. During Operation Defensive Shield, documents were captured that indicate *direct and systematic Saudi financial support of the families of Palestinian terrorists*, including the families of suicide terrorists who carried out lethal attacks inside Israel. In addition, documents were found that show direct Saudi aid to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas, two organizations that have been declared terror organizations by the US.

27. One of the documents captured is a table found in the "Tulkarm Charity Association", detailing the 10th payments cycle to "casualties of Intifada Al Quds" in the West Bank (in total, the payment cycle consisted of 2,040,000 Saudi Riyal, approx. \$545,000). The table lists payments made to 102 families of terrorists who died during 2001, each family receiving 20,000 Riyal (approx. \$5340). According to the table, the funds were transferred to the families through the Arab Bank. They were handed over to beneficiaries whose names and ID numbers are mentioned in the table.

28. The implication of this document is that a suicide terrorist embarking on a terrorist attack knows that his family will receive continuous aid from the Saudi regime after his death, by means of the Saudi committee for support of the Intifada.

29. It is of note that the Saudi aid does not only include the support of terrorist families. According to additional captured documents (Palestinian intelligence apparatus reports), the Saudis transferred *direct aid to extremist Islamic organizations* (Hamas and PIJ).

Chapter VII - Corruption in the PA

According to accumulating information, corruption is rampant in the PA's power centers. Below are a number of examples:

- a. Administrative irregularities (the Deputy Chairman of the Palestinian legislative council) detailed the PA's shortcomings: "Key officials in the PA suffer from a lack of reliability and talent, many unneeded without need, the appointment of family relations, waste, a policy of monopolies, corruption, the stealing of equipment and money and the phenomenon of "hidden unemployment".

Sa'eb Arekat "As the raiser of budgets from states contributing to the infrastructure development of the local authorities, I am trying to create total transparency between the donor state and the project taking place, by a direct connection between it and the contractor, without middlemen who put their hands in the money being used".

- b. The management of the Palestinian economy by monopolies in order to

accumulate financial resources outside the official framework and reward PA senior officials and their families (on the eve of the confrontation, the scope of revenues from the monopolies was estimated to be approx. \$300 million, with the business company of Muhammad Rashid, Arafat's economic advisor, controls the major monopolies including cement, fuel, the casino, the flour mill in Gaza and economic projects in the tourist and industrial realms.

k. An unjust distribution of aid funds between the different strata of the population. While the Palestinian population suffers from economic predicament, senior PA officials enjoy a high standard of living. Abu Ala completed the construction of a villa in Jericho at a cost of \$1.5 million. The villa's appearance is ostentatious and stimulated sharp criticism from the local population. Arafat distributes funds to PA senior officials for personal needs, including \$50,000 for the wedding of the daughter of "minister" Nabil Amar, the doubling of the living expenses of the son of "minister" Nabil Sha'ath who is studying in France and \$100,000 for the deputy in charge of the information portfolio for construction of a home. Residents from Deir El Balah whose homes were destroyed did not receive the Arafat grant of \$2,000 promised to them 4 months ago; Arafat's grant of \$600 to the unemployed financed by salaries from PA employees was distributed by the Ministry of Labor to cronies who are not unemployed.

l. Salary delays and theft - the payment of salaries to the public sector according to the low exchange rate of the dollar: The salaries of January 2002 were paid according to an exchange rate of 3.7 shekels to the dollar; A Gaza resident: "PA elements demanded \$2,000 from me, in order for my daughter who works as a doctor in the European hospital in Khan Yunis will receive her salary in an organized manner, the security apparatuses in the Karni crossing pay carriers working on the Israel side of the border salaries according to rates in the PA territories, while the salaries of the carriers received from Israeli manpower companies, which are calculated according to salary rates in Israel, find their way to their pockets.

m. The levying of taxes and special payments on the population in order to gain profits and supplement income. The money taken for medical treatment in the Sheikh Zayyad hospital in Ramallah is transferred to the pockets of senior PA officials, including the Province Governor; the Palestinian Ministry of Transportation issues licenses for short periods in order to profit from renewal of licenses; the police in Hebron collect from vegetable stall owners sums of money in return for continuing their trade "No one who earns \$800 will be hurt by \$50".

n. Utilization of humanitarian aid received from abroad for profits (the Palestinian Ministry of Agriculture granted Beduin cattle owners from Ramallah money vouchers, a donation from a European country in order to purchase barley. The ministry concluded with a barley salesman a price of \$800 per ton instead of \$600, with the difference pocketed by senior officials in the Ministry of Agriculture; Tanzim elements from Bethlehem forcefully seized food distributed by UNRWA and decided by themselves who would receive the aid.

o. Forceful contributions and false arrest of businessmen by the PA security forces and their release in exchange for money and bribes. A senior businessman from Tulkarm was forced to pay \$100,000 for the release of his brother who was arrested by the security apparatuses for collaboration with Israel. A Christian businessman paid \$5,000 for the release of his brother arrested by counter-intelligence apparatus personnel.

p. The non-payment to PA suppliers. A gas station owner in Jericho stated that the security apparatuses are systematically not paying him for fuel and when they were not permitted to fill up, they began to make threats.

q. The expropriation of lands arbitrarily. PA elements seized lands of the Orthodox Church in the Bethlehem area while using violence, forged documents and bribes. On some occasions, there was cooperation between church officials and the PA.

r. Subversion of justice by bribery of and threats to the lives of judges. A senior Tanzim activist who was involved in the rape and murder of a young woman from Bethlehem was set free after the judge was bribed.

Appendix

(Partial) Characteristics of the Terrorist Infrastructure which developed in

the PA

Jenin - The Capital of the Palestinian Suicide Terrorists

1. In Jenin, and especially in the refugee camp in its outskirts, an extensive infrastructure of various terrorist organizations existed prior to the IDF Defensive Wall Operation. These organizations cooperated in "exporting" killing and suicide attacks to Israel. An expression of this can be found in the following excerpt from an internal Fatah document:

2. "(Jenin refugee camp) is characterized by an exceptional presence of fighting men who take the initiative (on behalf of) the national activity. Nothing will beat them and nothing worries them. Therefore, they are ready for self-sacrifice with all the means. And therefore, it is not strange, that Jenin (has been termed) the suiciders capital" (A'simat Al-Istashidin, in Arabic). (From a report of the Fatah movement in Jenin refugee camp addressed to Marwan Barghouti, 25 September 2001)

3. Jenin, "the suiciders capital" "exported during the violent confrontation 28 suicide attacks (most were implemented and some were foiled), and many more terrorist attacks. This terrorism, perpetrated by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah and Hamas, resulted in the death of many dozens of Israelis and the wounding of hundreds.

4. Previous to the IDF Defensive Shield Operation, terror infrastructures of various organizations were concentrated in Jenin, mainly in its refugee camp. Below are general characteristics of the infrastructures of the three leading terrorist organizations:

a. Hamas - In Jenin and the surrounding villages, a Hamas network operated which was responsible for the perpetration of a number of lethal suicide attacks inside Israel (the most recent in Haifa on 31 March 2002 in which 15 Israelis were killed). The Jenin network operated in cooperation with many and diverse operational elements in the Hamas movement, as well as with the leadership abroad. This network was severely damaged following IDF activity in Tubas (on 5 April) in which 6 major operational activists from the Hamas were killed, including Qis Adwan (head of the Hamas infrastructure in Jenin who directed suicide attacks in Israel in which dozens of Israelis were killed, and Sa'ed Awad (head of the QASSAM-2 rocket project in Samaria, whose death impaired the rocket production infrastructure in Samaria). At the same time, additional senior activists such as Nasser Jerar (involved in the planning of spectacular attacks in Israel and the West Bank) and Jamal Abu Al Hija (head of Hamas in Jenin who directs terror activities and is involved in the transfer of money for financing such activities), are still at large and are active.

b. PIJ - Until the IDF operation, the PIJ infrastructure in Jenin was the strongest in the PA territories, mostly due to the massive financial aid it received for its activities from the PIJ leadership in Syria (according to captured documents). The PIJ infrastructure suffered a severe blow with the death of the head of the military infrastructure in Jenin, Mahmud Tu'albe (involved in the perpetration of terrorist attacks, including inside Israel), and the arrest of senior operational activists. Amongst the senior activists arrested, the most prominent are Ali Safuri (involved in the direction of a large number of terrorist attacks, including suicide and killing attacks inside Israel) and Thabet Mardawi (directed a large number of terrorist attacks, including suicide and killing attacks inside Israel).

c. Fatah/Al Aqsa Brigades/Tanzim - The Fatah network in Jenin (with all its names) served as a central terror focus. Local Fatah activists who according to captured documents were in close contact with Marwan Barghouti, perpetrated many shooting and explosive charges attacks in the West Bank and inside Israel, against the IDF and Israeli civilians. The last of these attacks was the suicide attack in a coffee shop in Tel Aviv on 30 March 2002 (one Israeli civilian killed and 45 wounded). Amongst the senior Fatah activists, the most notable are Jamal Hawil (responsible for direction of lethal terrorist attacks, arrested by the IDF) and Ita Abu Ramila (Fatah and Preventive Security Apparatus activist in Jenin).

5. Expressions of the scope and power of the terror infrastructures in the Jenin refugee camp, in Jenin and in the nearby villages (Qabatiyah and Tubas for example) can be found during Operation Defensive Wall: The intense fighting in the refugee camps which exacted a heavy price from the IDF, the large quantities of arms and explosives laboratories captured (see Appendix A) and the high number of senior and junior terrorist activists arrested or killed - all these are evidence of the depth of the terror infrastructure in the Jenin region.



**Explosives Laboratory
found in Jenin**

6. During the fighting, a large number of gunmen in small squads operated in the Jenin refugee camp from inside civilian buildings. Unlike in other towns, senior PIJ activists remained in the camp, stubbornly fighting against the IDF. The instructions they received were clear: There must be no surrender and you must spill as much as blood as possible from the IDF soldiers. Contrary to the Palestinian claims of a massacre ostensibly carried out by IDF soldiers in the camp, in which framework 500-600 innocent civilians were killed, in practice, according to IDF reports (correct for 16 April), 46 bodies were found in the refugee camps, 44 bodies of gunmen/fighters and 2 bodies of civilians).

7. It is important to emphasize that the terror activists who transformed the refugee camp into their "fortress" made cynical use of the local civilian population:

- a. They operated from inside populated houses, knowing that this would restrict the IDF reaction and with the hidden hope that severe casualties to civilians will damage Israel's image and lead to international pressure on it. (according to a press report, there were 1,500 civilians in Jenin refugee camp during the fighting and they did not leave the camp.
- b. They activated explosive charges whose detonation caused the destruction of homes and property of civilians. Thabet Mardawi, a senior PIJ activist from Jenin, admitted during his interrogation that during the battle with IDF soldiers in Jenin refugee camp, he exploded gas cylinders which destroyed homes in which civilians lived.

Characteristics of the Terror Infrastructure in Jenin and its Refugee Camp According to Captured Documents

8. The captured documents unveil the extensive scope of the terror infrastructures of the various organizations and the terrorist attacks originating from the Jenin area, and principally from Jenin refugee camp. Below are the main characteristics of this terror infrastructure according to captured documents examined so far:

- a. The depth of the human terror infrastructure in Jenin. In a Fatah report from Jenin refugee camp addressed to Marwan Barghouti, it is written that from all the districts, Jenin district is "overflowing with fighters of tremendous quality and quantity" who belong to Fatah and the other national and Islamic movements. The report states that Israel defines Jenin as a "hornet's nest" and this name is indeed correct since there are many youths in Jenin who are willing to sacrifice themselves, and therefore Jenin has been called the "Suicides Capital" (and indeed many suicide and killing attacks which resulted in the deaths of dozens of Israelis and the wounding of hundreds were "exported" to Israel by the terror infrastructure in Jenin).
- b. The mention of terrorist attacks, including killing and suicide attacks which were directed and perpetrated by the terror infrastructure in Jenin in order to weaken Israel. The captured documents mention attacks carried out against soldiers and civilians which originated in Jenin and the names of the organizations and terrorists who planned them. For example:
 - 1) Thabet Azmi Mardawi, a senior activist in the PIJ military arm, of whom it is written that he "participated in the preparation of a few suicide acts" (Mardawi is now under arrest in Israel. He is responsible for a large number of terrorist attacks, including suicide attacks inside Israel such as the suicide attack in Binyamina [16 July 2001] and the bus explosion in Wadi Ara [20 March 2002]).
 - 2) Ali Suleyman Al-Safuri, a senior activist in the PIJ military arm, of whom it is written that he "has a prominent role in the preparation of explosive belts and charges" (Al-Safuri is under arrest in Israel. He is

responsible, amongst other things, for the suicide attacks in Binyamina [16 July 2001] and Hadera (28 October 2001).

3) Muhammad Salah Salim Yassin, a senior activist in the PIJ military arm, of whom it is written that he "participated in the perpetration of a few suicide acts" (Yassin was killed by the IDF on 7 March 2002 and was indeed involved in killing attacks inside Israel).

4) Wa'el Ahmad Jalamnah from the PIJ (he is known to have driven his partner to the suicide attack in "Paris Square" in Haifa [26 February 2002] and succeeded in escaping to Jenin refugee camp). According to a captured document, the two activists departed from Jenin refugee camp. According to the document, Jalamnah succeeded in fleeing to Jenin (after the attack in Haifa was foiled and his partner was arrested).

5) A captured document mentions the "murder of a settler" and wounding of 20 others during activity of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades originating from Jenin.

6) A captured document mentions the implementation of the "Umm el Fahm act" in "Israel's depth" which was perpetrated by the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (the intention is to the firing carried out on 28 April 2001 at a car in Umm Al Fahm. An Israeli civilian was killed in the attack and another was wounded).

7) An additional captured document mentions a suicide attack in Afula in which PA intelligence apparatus activists from Jenin were involved together with the PIJ (the intention is to the killing attack in Afula on 27 November 2001 perpetrated by the PIJ and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades).

h. The existence of a strong terror infrastructure which was built by the PIJ and Hamas, which depends, amongst other things, on intensive use of its financial resources. According to the documents, the large amounts of money flowing to Jenin from Damascus (see below) enable PIJ and Hamas to recruit to their ranks youths with motivation, provide them with a monthly salary and solve their financial problems (while posing a challenge to Fatah which does not have such large financial resources and whose members, as reported in one document, receive financial aid from PIJ). The strength of their financial sources enabled these organizations, inter alia, to penetrate the ranks of the Palestinian intelligence apparatuses, bribe senior commanders of apparatuses in the Jenin area and receive assistance from them in operational activity and in protection against expected PA moves.

i. The existence in Jenin of a terror infrastructure of the Fatah and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades/Tanzim which is in contact with Marwan Barghouti, who provides them with money and budgets, and which competes with PIJ and Hamas. A captured document states that Jenin "refugee camp" is considered to be a Fatah "fortress" in the (Jenin) district and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the camp are those "who consolidated Fatah's presence and operational capabilities". According to a captured document from May 2001, there are 63 Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades fighters in the Jenin district divided into four military units (it is assumed that their number has since risen). Their activity, it is written "focuses on the weakening of the Israeli enemy" and the defense of the refugee camp (in cooperation with other elements). The main constraint which blocked their progress (at least in the first half of 2001) was the financial constraint, and the Fatah activists in Jenin expected Marwan Barghouti to assist them in overcoming this problem.

j. Trans-organizational operational cooperation expressed by joint terrorist attacks in Israel and joint preparations to defend Jenin. There are a few expressions of this cooperation in the captured documents:

1) The existence of joint frameworks for all the terrorist organizations. The documents mention the "combined force" which apparently operates in the context of a defense plan for Jenin and whose men belong to all the organizations operating there (it is possible that the units operating in this framework are called "guard units". One document mentions a joint operations room in Jenin.

2) The existence of inter-organizational operational cooperation in the perpetration of terrorist attacks inside Israel. One document notes that the commander of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the Jenin area recruited one of the terrorists who took part in the suicide attack in Afula (on 27 November 2001 in which 2 Israeli civilians were killed and approx. 50 wounded). The responsibility for this attack was indeed jointly claimed

by the PIJ and Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. We are familiar with additional cases of inter-organizational cooperation (Fatah and PIJ) in perpetration of terrorist attacks inside Israel which originated in the Jenin area (see following section).

3) Cooperation in various realms between Fatah and local PA intelligence apparatuses and the PIJ and Hamas. This is expressed not only in joint terrorist attacks but also in warnings of expected activities by the PA which were transferred to the PIJ by the Deputy Chief of the Preventive Security Directorate in Jenin; in early reporting of expected arrests and names of wanted persons by the PA, in the procurement of arms by Preventive Security officers for the PIJ and Hamas in the Jenin area. One captured document states that the Deputy Head of the Preventive Security Directorate supplied Hamas and PIJ with weapons from "the arms depot in northern Palestine whose contents were stolen" (the intention is to the arms stolen from Kibbutz Manara, some of which, according to a press report was found by the IDF in Jenin).

m. The direction of the PIJ terror infrastructure in the Jenin area by the organization's headquarters in Damascus. In this framework, one document states that Dr. Ramadan Shalakh, the PIJ secretary, transfers large sums of money to PIJ activists in Jenin, for financial aid to the families of martyrs and also for payment of expenses for suicide and killing attacks. According to this document, he transferred a large sum of money for the suicide and killing attacks in Afula (27 November 2001), whose "sundry expenses" was a sum of \$31,000. In addition, a sum of \$127,000 is mentioned as aid to support the families of martyrs and activists under arrest (these sums of money also constituted a source for corruption and internal strife amongst PIJ members in Jenin).

n. One captured document indicates ties between senior activists in the Jenin terror infrastructure and Israeli Arabs, while exploiting the fact that the refugees living in the Jenin area originate from the Galilee. The document notes that Bassam Ragheb Al Sa'adi, a senior PIJ activist in Jenin who deals in money transfers, conducts "extensive ties with people inside the green line (areas)". (Bassam Sa'adi is known to be a PIJ senior activist in Jenin who is responsible for the perpetration of a few bomb attacks inside Israel including in Hadera (25 May 2001) and Netanya (30 January 2001)).

Major Attacks Carried out by the Terrorist Infrastructure in Jenin

Hamas

1. 9 September 2001 - A suicide attack in Nahariya, 3 Israelis killed and 48 wounded, the attacker was an Israeli Arab from the Galilee.
2. 19 March 2002 - A shooting attack in Hamam Al Maliach (Jordan Valley), an IDF officer was killed and 3 Israelis were wounded.
3. 31 March 2002 - Suicide attack in Haifa, leaving 15 Israeli civilians dead and 33 wounded. The attacker was from Jenin refugee camp, and had an Israeli ID card.

PIJ

1. 16 July 2001 - A suicide attack at the Binyamina railway station killing 2 Israelis and wounding 10.
2. 28 October 2001 - A shooting attack in Hadera killing 4 Israelis and wounding 42.
3. 29 November 2001 - A suicide attack at a junction near an army base near Pardes Hanna killing 3 Israelis and wounding 9.
4. 25 January 2002 - A suicide attack at the old Central Bus Station in Tel Aviv leaving 23 wounded (in cooperation with Fatah).
5. 5 January 2002 - A suicide attack in Afula, killing one Israeli and wounding 15.
6. 20 March 2002 - A suicide attack in a bus in Wadi Ara, killing 7 Israelis and wounding 28.
7. 10 April 2002 - A suicide attack at the Yagur junction, killing 8 Israelis and wounding 20.

Fatah

1. 1 February 2001 - The murder of Lior Ataya.
2. 28 April 2001 - Shooting at a car near Umm al Fahm, killing one Israeli civilian and

wounding another (female).

3. 1-3 May 2001 - Test firing of mortar bombs produced by Fatah activists.
4. 28 June 2001 - Shooting at a vehicle near Ganim, one woman was killed.
5. 8 August 2001 - The laying of a charge at Golani Junction, there were no casualties.
6. 11 September 2001 - Shooting at "Bezek" workers near Shaked and detonation of a charge at an IDF force that was carrying out searches in the area. An Israeli civilian and 4 soldiers were wounded.
7. 4 October 2001 - A terrorist disguised as a soldier fired at Israeli civilians in the central bus station in Afula. 3 civilians were killed and 14 wounded.
8. 27 October 2001 - Infiltration to the settlement of Me Ammi and laying of a charge there. There were no casualties.
9. 9 November 2001 - Shooting at an Israeli vehicle near Yabed. An Israeli civilian woman was killed.
10. 27 November 2001 - A joint PIJ and Fatah suicide attack, in which terrorists fired at civilians in the Afula central bus station. 2 Israeli civilians were killed and 50 wounded.
11. 8 February 2002 - Masterminding of a joint PIJ and Fatah suicide attack aimed at Tel Aviv. The attack was prevented when the squad was intercepted in Jenin, when the terrorists detonated the explosive belt in their possession.
12. 7 March 2002 - A terrorist hurls a charge that was hidden in a birds cage during a chase in Karkur.
13. 11 March 2002 - Shooting at a truck. An Israeli Arab incurred medium wounds.
14. 12 March 2002 - Shooting at an Israeli vehicle on the road to the village of Katsir, one Israeli was severely wounded and 2 lightly wounded.
15. 21 March 2002 - A suicide attack in a Jerusalem cafe, killing 3 Israeli civilians and wounding 71.
16. 22 March 2002 - A suicide terrorist blew himself up near an IDF force, near Anin village, a soldier incurred medium wounds.
17. 30 March 2002 - A suicide attack in a Tel Aviv cafe, killing one Israeli civilian and wounding 45.

Nablus - The Main Infrastructure of Palestinian Terrorism

1. Nablus constituted the main Palestinian terrorism infrastructure and the headquarters of the terrorist organizations' leaderships in the West Bank. This infrastructure directed and executed suicide attacks in which scores of Israeli citizens were killed and over 400 were wounded. The terrorism operational centers in Nablus instructed terrorist squads in the Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, and Ramallah areas to perpetrate terror attacks in the West Bank and inside Israel.



A tunnel that served for concealing and smuggling arms

2. The operational cooperation between the various terror organizations in Nablus resulted in murderous terror attacks, which were jointly carried out by the planners of the PIJ in Jenin, the Hamas explosives laboratories in Nablus, and Fatah/Tanzim suicide bombers.



Pipe charges found in an explosives lab in the Nablus Casbah

3. During Operation Defensive Shield and in previous IDF activities, 18 explosives laboratories, 10 explosive belts, and hundreds of kilos of explosives (some standard high power explosives) were found in Nablus. In addition, 7 Qassam rockets and their production labs were found. Most of the labs and the arms caches were found in the Balata refugee camp (RC) and in the Casbah (the old city) of Nablus. Tunnels were also discovered in the Casbah used for hiding and smuggling arms. Arms caches and wanted terrorists were also found in the homes of the mayor of

Nablus and the commander of the Palestinian Police, which attests to the direct involvement of PA officials in terrorist activities in the Nablus area.

4. The continuous IDF activities in the Nablus area, especially Operation Defensive Shield, significantly damaged the Hamas and Fatah terror infrastructure. Nevertheless, the activists who escaped from Nablus will attempt to return and execute terror attacks as revenge for the IDF operation, and in order to prove that Israel did not manage to eliminate terrorism.

5. The main terror organizations operating in Nablus were: Hamas, Fatah, and the PFLP. According to captured documents, these organizations cooperated in order to defend the city and the neighboring refugee camps vis-a-vis the IDF troops. At least 30 Fatah activists who operated in Nablus were soldiers in the "National Security Apparatus" and were attached to the Fatah/Tanzim in the city. They received regular salaries from the PA during the entire confrontation with Israel. In our assessment there were hundreds of gunmen in the city.

6. The cooperation network between the organizations was based on geographical sectors - the old city, the refugee camps, etc. Each sector incorporated members of the Fatah, Hamas, the DFLP, PFLP, PDA (a DFLP branch headed by the PA Information Minister Yasser Abd Rabu), the PFLP-GC/Jibril Front and the "People's HQ" (former Communists).

The Terror Infrastructures According to Organizations and Subjects

7. The Hamas

- a. The leadership and the heads of the Hamas operational apparatus ("Az-al-Din al-Qassam battalions") in the West Bank resided in Nablus.
- b. Most of the explosive charges and explosive belts used for the Hamas suicide bombings in Israel, including the attack in Haifa (December 2001, 15 Israelis killed) and the massacre on Passover Eve in Netanya (27 March, 2002, 28 Israelis killed) were produced in Nablus.
- c. The apparatus activists in Nablus directed the Hamas network activities in Tulkarm which perpetrated the suicide attack in Netanya.
- d. The Hamas activists in Nablus who constitute in practice the organization's leadership in the West Bank, masterminded and directed from the city areas which served as its main headquarters, most of the murder attacks which the movement carried out in Israel and in the West Bank since the outbreak of the current confrontation with the Palestinians, e.g. Emmanuel (December 2001, 11 Israelis killed, and 27 wounded), Hamra in the Jordan Valley (February 2002, 3 Israelis killed), Elon Moreh (28 March, 2002, 4 Israelis killed).

8. The Qassam rockets

- a. In Nablus operated the Hamas infrastructure which produced Qassam 2 rockets (6-7 kilometer range with an enlarged explosives warhead). Nablus constituted the center of knowhow for the production and operation of the rockets in the West Bank.
- b. The rockets were developed in the Gaza Strip by the Hamas infrastructure. The knowhow and operational doctrine were transferred from Gaza to Sa'ed Awad in the West Bank who was in charge of the Qassam program, assembled the activists and established the production labs disposition. Awad made an effort to transfer the knowhow and rockets to other organizations and activists in order to extend the use of rockets as the main weapon against Israel. These infrastructures were led by Sa'ed Awad and Majdi Balasmeh (who were killed in a clash with IDF troops in April 2002).
- c. The Nablus infrastructure transferred the operational rockets to Tulkarm, in order to launch them at cities in the center of Israel. In addition, it tried to transfer them to Jenin, an attempt foiled by Israeli forces



A lab for developing Qassam 2 rockets found in Balata refugee camp, where 7 rockets were found.



Qassam 2 rockets found in Balata refugee camp.

in January 2002 (8 rockets and launchers were captured).

e. The infrastructure's core was uncovered and destroyed during an IDF operation in Balata RC on 27-28 February 2002, in which Israeli forces broke into several production laboratories and seized 7 rockets.



A lab for developing Qassam 2 rockets in Balata refugee camp.

9. The Fatah

A number of Fatah cells operated in Nablus, and carried out hundreds of shooting and explosive charge attacks. The main Fatah cell in Nablus was headed by Nasser Aweis (arrested April 2002), it was responsible for the following:

- a. At least 7 suicide attacks in Israel in which 15 Israeli civilians were killed and over 200 wounded.
- b. Served as the center for planning and logistics for Fatah cells in Tulkarm, Qalqilya, and Ramallah, which carried out attacks under the name of "Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades". It provided the terrorists in these cities with funds, arms and knowhow to produce explosive charges.
- c. The network of Fatah cells was supported by Marwan Barghouti (arrested in April 2002), the head of the "Fatah Supreme Council" in the West Bank and the leader of the Fatah/Tanzim in this area.

10. Cooperation between the various terrorist organizations

The various organizations cooperated between them on the basis of the relative advantage of each organization. Thus, the PIJ planners joined forces with the highly lethal Hamas explosive charges and the Fatah suicide bombers. This collaboration led to the following:

- a. An attempted double suicide attack at the old central bus station in Tel Aviv (25 January 2002, 26 Israelis injured).
- b. The transfer of Qassam rockets and some of the production knowhow to other terrorist organizations, particularly to the Fatah.

11. The PA's involvement in terror

The PA security apparatuses in Nablus were involved in terror both by giving terrorist activists a safe haven and by directly perpetrating terrorist attacks:

- a. The head of military intelligence in Nablus, Maher Fares, operated a terrorist cell which placed an explosive charge on a Tel Aviv bus (28 December 2000, 9 Israelis wounded) and carried out various shooting and explosive charge attacks in the sector. Three senior activists of the cell were killed while attempting to prepare a car bomb (30 July 2001). The head of military intelligence in Nablus also operated a terrorist squad in the village of Salfit, which perpetrated over 10 shooting attacks in the Nablus area.
- b. Various terror activists joined the PA ranks, which enabled them to receive monthly salaries while continuing their terrorist activities. Nasser Aweis, a senior Fatah terror activist in the West Bank, was on the PA General Intelligence payroll and later also on the PA National Security payroll. In his interrogation, Aweis confessed that he himself and terror activists of the Fatah/Tanzim carried out attacks in Israel that were financed by Arafat, who would personally sign the approval of aid provided him via Barghouti.
- c. Individual PA security apparatus activists joined up to carry out terror attacks. Ibrahim Hasouna, who carried out the "Sea Food Market" restaurant attack in Tel Aviv (5 March 2002, 3 Israelis killed) belonged to the PA Naval Force apparatus in Nablus. Said Ramadan, who carried out the suicide attack in the center of Jerusalem (22 January 2002, 2 Israelis killed) also belonged to the PA Naval Force

Major Terrorist Attacks that Originated in the Nablus Terrorist Infrastructure

Date	Terrorist Attack	No. of	No. of
------	------------------	--------	--------

		Israelis Killed	Israelis Wounded
Hamas			
1 June 2001	Tel Aviv "Dolphinarium" discotheque	21	120
9 August 2001	Sbarro restaurant, Jerusalem	15	107
2 December 2001	Haifa	15	37
12 December 2001	Emmanuel	11	27
6 February 2002	Hamrah	3	2
9 February 2002	Tapuah Jct.	1	1
28 February 2002	Elon Moreh	4	
Total		70	337
Fatah			
1 April 2001	Kfar Salem	1	
17 June 2001	Mt. Eival		1
12 July 2001	Bracha		3
2 August 2001	Mt. Eival		
19 September 2001	Oranit		2
28 September 2001	Samaritans Neighborhood in Nablus		
30 September 2001	Kusin		1
9 October 2001	Oranit		1
10 October 2001	Kfar Tzara		1
22 October 2001	Burqa		1
31 October 2001	Kusin		
31 October 2001	Ra'anana (home of an IDF officer)		
11 November 2001	Kfar Hess	1	1
19 November 2001	Shavei Shomron		3
15 December 2001	Sha'ar Ephraim		
24 December 2001	Shavei Shomron		1
17 January 2002	Hadera	6	25
22 January 2002	Jerusalem	1	9
25 January 2002	Tel Aviv Central Bus Station		26
27 January 2002	Jerusalem	1	131
5 February 2002	Yitzhar		1

17 February 2002	IDF Camp (near Pardes Hanna)		9
15 February 2002	Surda roadblock	1	
27 February 2002	Maccabim roadblock		2
5 March 2002	Tel Aviv	3	26
7 March 2002	Karkur		
7 March 2002	Hawarra		1
8 March 2002	Beit Hananya		
9 March 2002	Netanya	2	58
16 March 2002	Kfar Saba	1	8
30 March 2002	Baq'a al-Sharqiyah	1	
Total			
PFLP			
27 August 2001	Beit Furiq	1	
7 March 2002	Ariel		14
Total		1	14

Bethlehem - Mistreatment of the Christian Population

1. A document captured by the IDF in Bethlehem during Operation Defensive Wall concerns a request by the "Fatah/Al Aqsa Martyrs (and Church of) Nativity Brigades" to the Bethlehem municipality for aid in the form of monetary contributions for its military arm. The request (dated November 7th 2001) is explained by the fact that the Fatah's widening military activity has caused an increase in its military infrastructure's daily expenses (fees for communications sets, fuel for vehicles and so on).

2. The implications arising from this document:

a. Audacity and brazenness in the very adopting of a Christian religious symbol by a terrorist organization. The "Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades" (which the document proves are identical to Fatah), which was recently declared a terrorist organization by the US, has adopted in Bethlehem a Christian religious symbol recognized worldwide. This, in our view, in order to try to gain legitimacy among Bethlehem's Christian residents, and portray itself as their protector. It requires no small degree of blatant audacity, brazenness and cynicism to add the Church of the Nativity to the name of an organization that perpetrates suicide attacks against innocent civilians inside Israel, and make a link between the places holy to Islam and Christianity in the context of terrorist activities.

b. The maintaining of a protection racket by armed groups that abuse the local population. It is not known how the Bethlehem municipality responded to the request. However, the request itself for aid from municipal budgets earmarked for the local civilian population's needs is not "innocent" and it is part of a protection racket imposed on the local population, local businessmen and civilian institutions.

c. The transfer of funds from PA civilian institutions to Fatah's terrorist infrastructure. The document gives expression to the various financing channels at the disposal of "Fatah/Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades". In one of its documents the "Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades" make a request to Fuad Shubaki, a close associate of Arafat, to finance vital ongoing and infrastructure needs for continuing their terrorist activities. In this document they address a civilian municipal authority that receives its budget from the Palestinian "Finance Ministry" (which receives European Union grants) and from contributions of Christian institutions worldwide.

3. The contents of this document correspond with many reports on extortion, unwarranted arrests, protection and corruption prevailing in Bethlehem, simultaneously with the terrorist campaign waged against Israel. The following